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Price-dependent  or  inverse  demand  systems,  in  which  quantities  are  exogenous  and 
prices  are  the  dependent  variables,  have  been  studied  extensively  in  consumption 
economics.
1
 Most of the studies of these systems have made use of either the direct 
utility function or the distance function to generate inverse Marshallian or Hicksian 
demands  by  applying,  respectively,  the  Hotelling -Wold  identity  or  the  Shephard -
Hanoch lemma. Recently, additional attention has been given to the benefit function, 
which was first introduced and developed by Luenberger (1992). This function is now 
recognized to be of particular value in welfare analysis because its aggregation property 
makes  it attractive to analyze welfare changes  for heterogeneous consumers.
2
 For 
instance, benefit functions of different individuals could be directly summed to obtain The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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meaningful aggregate benefit, which could be used to measure the welfare implications 
of changes in the economy.  
Despite its obvious potential for policy applications, there are few theoretical and 
empirical  applications  beyond  those  considered  originally  by  Luenberger  (1992)  & 
(1995), Chambers, Chung and Färe (1996), and Baggio and Chavas (2006). A possible 
reason for the scarcity of applications is that the benefit function is not a convenient 
vehicle  for  generating  empirical  demand  models,  as  the  dual  relationships  between 
inverse  Marshallian  (or  Hicksian)  demands  and  the  adjusted  price  functions  derived 
from a benefit function are not well established. We provide here an attempt to establish 
such relationships. 
The first aim of this paper is to advocate a more practical use of benefit functions 
in  representing  preferences  and  specifying  inverse  demand  models.  In  particular,  it 
proposes  the  exploitation  of  additional  duality  relationships  to  generate  systems  of 
price-dependent demand functions alternative to the more typical approaches to deriving 
inverse  Marshallian  and  Hicksian  systems.  As  will  be  clear  from  the  following 
discussion, the price-dependent demand systems derived from direct utility functions, 
distance  functions  and  benefit  functions  are  intimately  related  by  a  series  of 
relationships,  which  allow  simple  transformations  from  any  one  to  the  others. 
Combining one of these relationships with known results for expenditure-normalized 
inverse prices allows expenditure-normalized inverse prices to be derived directly from 
the benefit function (a result to be referred to as the Hotelling-Wold Analogue for the 
benefit function). In this way the theoretical and empirical analysis based on benefit 
functions is greatly facilitated, and it is such analysis that forms the main theme of this 
paper. 
The  second  aim  is  to  demonstrate the  feasibility  of  using  benefit  functions  to The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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specify  estimable  yet  general  and  regular  price-dependent  demand  systems. 
Differentiation  of  a  chosen  benefit  function  with  respect  to  quantities  yields 
Luenberger’s adjusted price functions, according to the envelope theorem. Since these 
functions are explicit in the unobservable utility level, in most cases they do not have a 
closed-form  representation  as  their  Marshallian  counterparts  i.e.  in  terms  of  the 
observable variables such as quantities.
3
 This “operational complexity” however need 
not hamper the empirical exploitation of benefit functions.
4
 A simple one-dimensional 
numerical inversion allows estimation of the parameters of a benefit function via the 
parameters of the implied inverse Marshallian demands.  The formal theory for using a 
benefit function in this context will be developed and illustrated in  the next section of 
this paper. 





 ) denoting the non-negative (or positive) orthant, let x
N
 represent an 
N-vector of commodities, p
N
  the corresponding price vector, and g
N
 (  g0 ) an 
arbitrary  (fixed)  N-vector  of  goods  that  serves  as  a  reference  bundle.  Suppose  that 
individual preferences are represented by a direct utility function u = U(x). Following 
Luenberger (1992) & (1995), the benefit function (B) for these preferences is defined as: 
(1)  B(x, u; g) = Max b {b s.t. U(x - bg)  u, and x  bg}, 
which measures how many units of g an individual is willing to give up to move from a 
utility u to the point x.
5
 Provided that the direct utility function is continuous, increasing 
and quasi-concave in x, then the benefit function is continuous, increasing and concave 
in x, decreasing in u, and satisfies a translation property: B( ,  ) B( ,  ) uu   x g x . 
Luenberger has shown that u = U(x) implies that B(x, u) = 0 if g is a “good” (that is, 
U( ) U( )   x g x for all x and  0  ) and that B(x, u) = 0 implies  U(x) = u if  0  x . The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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Luenberger  (1992)  and  (1995)  proves  a  duality  between  the  benefit  and  cost 
functions corresponding to the utility function, and hence there is a duality between the 
benefit function and the corresponding direct utility function. Applying the envelope 
theorem,  Luenberger  introduces  what  he  refers  to  as  the  “adjusted  price  functions”, 
which can be derived from a benefit function via simple differentiation; i.e. 
(2)            P
L
i (x, u; g) = B/xi = Bxi        
where the superscript “L” is to remind us that (2) are the Luenberger functions derived 
from a benefit function.  Since the translation property implies 








,       




P1 g   . Because of 
the dependence of the equation systems in (2) on quantities x and utility u, the functions 
P
L
i  are clearly analogous to inverse Hicksian demands. An issue with this analogy is the 
potential dependence of the derivatives in  (2) on the choice of reference vector  g. To 
clarify this analogy and establish a useful notation, consider first the direct Marshallian 
( M
i X ) and Hicksian ( H
i X ) demand functions which are the solutions to the following 
constrained optimization problems: 
(4)        
M
i X , c p   solution of  Max x {U(x) s.t. p'x  c}, and    
(5)        
H
i X , u p   solution of   Min x {p'x s.t. U(x) ≥ u},     
where c is a level of total expenditure, and the superscript “M” for Marshallian (or “H” 
for Hicksian) helps to clarify ideas, and is motivated by the arguments (p, c) (or (p, u)) 
of the corresponding functions.  The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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The budget constraint p'x  c (in fact p'x = c by non-satiation) in (4) has two 
implications for the direct Marshallian demand systems: i) because the solutions satisfy 
the  one-dimensional  constraint, only  N-1  of  the  N  equations  in  (4)  are  functionally 
independent;  and  ii)  because  of  the  linearity  of  the  budget  constraint  M
i X  is 
homogeneous of degree zero in (p, c), and only N-1 of the N equations in (4) are then 
linearly independent. Unless one is willing to actually condition on c, then in order to 
define the concept of  inverse demands corresponding to these direct demands some 
normalization is required. A standard normalization is to define expenditure-normalized 
prices r = p/c and hence use homogeneity to rewrite X M
i  as 
(6)   
MM








,   
which  can,  at  least  in  principle,  then  be  inverted  to  give  the  inverse  Marshallian 
demands 
(7)   
IM
ii  = R x r    
where the superscript “IM” (for inverse Marshallian) refers to the arguments (x) of the 
corresponding  functions.  The  inverse  Marshallian  demands  (7)  can  most 
straightforwardly be defined by the standard dual approach as the solution to 
(8)       
M U Min U  s.t.  ' 1  r x r r x    
(where  U
M
  is  the  indirect  utility  function),  in  which  case  the  inverse  Marshallian 
demands follow from the envelope theorem as 
  























a result usually referred to as the Hotelling-Wold identity.   The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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Similarly, the Hicksian direct demands (5) are homogeneous of degree zero in p 
so that again some normalization of prices is required. However, even with the standard 
normalization of prices derivation of inverse demands is not straightforward. As is well 
known, the Slutsky and Antonelli matrices are singular of rank N-1, and thus there is an 
essential singularity in the relation between direct and inverse Hicksian demands.
6
  
Analogously to the case  of inverse Marshallian demands,  the inverse Hicksian 
demands can also be defined as the solution to a dual optimization problem: D(x, u) = 
Min r {r'x   s.t. C(r, u) = 1}, where D(x, u) is the distance function, and C(r, u) = Min x 
{r'x  s.t. u ≥ U(x)} is the normalized cost function, which uses the same normalization 
of prices as above. In this case, the envelope theorem gives     
i
IH
i i x    R , D ,  r u u  xx , 
a result often known as the Shephard-Hanoch lemma. Of course a further alternative 
approach  to  generating  inverse  Hicksian  demands  is  to  specify  the  constrained 
optimization: Min x {r'x : U(x)  u} and to manipulate the first order conditions to solve 
for the r as dependent variables, as functions of x and u as independent variables. 
  Another possible normalization of prices is to use the arbitrary reference vector g 
introduced in the definition of the benefit function, and apply the normalization p'g = 1. 
This amounts to the introduction of the alternative set of normalized prices si = pi / p'g 
and allows the Hicksian demands to be written as 
(10)        xi =  
H
i X ,  p u  =  H








=   
H
i X , u s . 
Inverse demands might be written in the notation 
(11)   
IH
ii  = S ,  x su .   
A similar singularity exists between the Hicksian demands and the Luenberger price 
functions as between the direct and inverse Hicksian demands, as shown by Luenberger 
(1996), and again the use of an appropriate dual result is the most straightforward way The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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to define the “inverse” relationship.  Luenberger (1992) shows that provided U(x) is 
quasi-concave and continuous, the following duality relationship holds: 
(12)        B ,  ;  =Inf   - C ,   s.t.   = 1,  0 uu   s x g s x s s g s . 
 Luenberger (1996) then defines the “adjusted price function” as an envelope result: 
(13)          , ;  Argmin C ,   s.t.  1,  0 S u u      s x g s x s s g s . 












i (x, u) 
where, for clarity, the notation P
L
i (x, u) has been replaced by   
IH
i S ,  x u to reflect the 
specific  normalization  of  prices.  The  matrix  of  derivatives  of  these  functions  with 
respect to quantities is singular because of the implication (3) of the translation property. 
System (14) is an inverse in the sense that: 
7
 
(15)   
LH i





While inverse Marshallian or Hicksian demands cannot give absolute prices, the 









pg r g p g
, and 





px s x p x
pg
  then 
(17)              ii
ii
R ,  S , 










These results suggest a two-step procedure in which the benefit function can be used to 
construct  “standard”  (i.e.  functions  defining  expenditure-normalized  prices)  inverse 
Hicksian demand functions: The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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x .   
With this background, it is illustrative to see how (18) can be derived more directly. 
Recall that the benefit function is an implicit representation of the direct utility function:  
(19)    B ,U 0    xx .   
Differentiating once gives 
ii B B U 0  x u x , implying that 
ii B B U  x u x . Weighting by 
quantities and summing, this implies that 
j j jj
jj
B = -B U  x u x xx , and using these two 

















 where  the  last 
equality follows by the Hotelling-Wold Identity.
9
  
Estimation of demand systems is usually carried out using budget shares. Thus we 
collect the foregoing results together in a form that is referred to as: 
The Hotelling-Wold Analogue for the Benefit Function: Given a functional form for 
a  benefit  function  satisfying  the  appropriate  regularity  conditions, the  corresponding 
inverse Hicksian and Marshallian share equations can be derived as 










W ,   =  R ,  =









, and   







B [ , U( )]
W  = W , U( ) =








       
where U(x) is obtained by inverting the identity function  (19). 
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Considerations in the Choice of a Functional Form for a Benefit 
Function 
Econometric analysis of demand systems essentially relates to empirical representations 
of  underlying  preference  orderings  within  the  framework  of  “rational”  consumer 
behavior. A standard result on preference ordering representation is the existence of a 
direct  utility  function,  but  its  application  in  the  standard  situation  of  endogenous 
quantities and exogenous prices and expenditure requires the analytical solution of a 
nonlinear optimization problem, which  limits applicability to simple and empirically 
unacceptable functional forms.  
Duality theory provides the way forward for empirical work. Provided the dual 
function  satisfies  appropriate  regularity  conditions  (typically  curvature,  monotonicity 
and  homogeneity  conditions),  then  the  problem  of  an  analytic  solution  of  an 
optimization problem is avoided, and replaced by the need to specify a regular dual 
function. So the standard results are the followings: to specify Marshallian demands, we 
represent preferences by an indirect utility function and apply Roy’s Identity; to specify 
inverse Marshallian demands, we represent preferences by a direct utility function and 
apply  the  Hotelling-Wold  Identity;  to  specify  Hicksian  demands,  we  represent 
preferences  by  a  cost  function  and  apply  Shephard’s  Lemma;  to  specify  inverse 
Hicksian  demands,  we  represent  preferences  by  a  distance  function  and  apply  the 
Shephard-Hanoch lemma (or by a benefit function and apply Luenberger’s result (14)).  
Since  utility  is  an  unobservable  variable,  one  may  think  that  empirical  work 
should  be  restricted to the  first two of  these.  However, the  imposition  of  regularity 
conditions  is  crucial,  since  the  duality  results  only  apply  in  regions  of  regularity. 
Because the indirect utility function and direct utility function are required to be quasi-
convex or quasi-concave respectively, it is quite difficult to construct reasonably general The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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functional forms, because, for example, linear combinations of quasi-convex functions 
are not necessarily quasi-convex, and decreasing quasi-convex functions of decreasing 
quasi-convex  functions  are  not  necessarily  quasi-convex.  Hence  only  simple  regular 
representations of preferences are available in these cases. Note that this is not the case 
with  concave  or  convex  functions,  for  which  various  composition  rules  maintain 
regularity. For example, positive linear combinations of increasing concave functions 
are  increasing  concave,  and  increasing  concave  functions  of  increasing  concave 
functions are also increasing and concave. One can construct arbitrary rank (in the sense 
of Lewbel (1992)) cost and distance functions that are regular over unbounded (and 
policy  relevant) regions.  These  functions  can  then  be  used  to  represent  Marshallian 
functions  by  the  use  of  a  simple  one  dimensional  numerical  inversion  (a  technique 
introduced  in  McLaren,  Rossiter,  and  Powell  (2000)),  a  small  cost  to  pay  for  the 
enhanced  regularity  properties  of  the  resulting  representation  of  preferences.  The 
purpose of this paper  is to extend this analysis to the use of benefit  functions, thus 
further  extending  the  capacity  to  represent  preferences  by  regular  functional  forms. 
Because  of  the  translation  property,  regular  benefit  functions  are  not  as  easy  to 
generalize as are regular cost and distance functions. However, the following result is 
straightforward to demonstrate. Given m regular benefit functions each with reference 
vector g, then a positive weighted average of these  m  functions  is a regular benefit 
function with reference vector g.  
Note  that  the  use  of  “flexible”  functional  forms  is  not  attractive.  Flexible 
functional forms (such as Translog) have one attractive property: the ability to represent 
an arbitrary set of price and income elasticities at a point in price-income space. Usually 
they  cannot  be  constrained  to  satisfy  the  required  regularity  properties  (apart  from 
homogeneity) even at this particular point, but far more damaging is that they cannot be The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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constrained to satisfy the regularity properties required by a dual specification even over 
the sample space, let alone over points outside the sample space where we may wish to 
carry out policy analysis. (As an illustration, CGE models typically do not use flexible 
functional  forms.)  Thus  well-known  “flexible”  functional  forms  are  not  necessarily 
useful for empirical specification of dual representations of preferences.   
The Numerical Inversion Estimation Method 
As shown in (20) and (21), the benefit function, together with its derivative property, 
provides  a  convenient  vehicle  for  generating  inverse  Hicksian  share  systems. 
Specifically,  for  a  chosen  reference  bundle  g  and  a  parametric  specification  of  B 
satisfying certain conditions, one could obtain a share system by the above result.  If we 
could invert the benefit function B explicitly to give the implied direct utility function 
U(x), then the inverse Hicksian shares could be “Marshallianized” by replacing the u by 
U(x)  as  shown  in  (21).
10
 In practice, however, it is only in simple cases  that it  is 
possible to obtain a closed-form solution for U(x) for an arbitrary specification of B; it 
depends heavily on the particular parametric form of B. This paper focuses on the class 
of benefit functions for which such explicit inversion is not available; that is, solving 
B(x, u) = 0 for U(x) may not be accomplished analytically, and thus the benefit function 
cannot be equivalently represented by a closed form direct utility function.  
For a given parametric form for the benefit function with parameters , the inverse 
Marshallian share system could be expressed implicitly by the set of functions: 


















,  and       
(23)          B(x, u; ) = 0.               
Provided that the benefit function is strictly decreasing in u, then it becomes feasible to 
numerically invert (23) to express u as a function of x and  . Therefore, given a specific The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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functional form for B and , the corresponding inverse share system can be written as: 
(24)  W
IH






B ( ,  ;  )













B [ , U( ;  );  ]









i (x; ),    
where u = U(x; ) is the numerical solution of the identity function B(x, u; ) = 0 for u, 
solved at the given values of x and . 
  In a maximum likelihood search for the parameters of the inverse budget shares, 
explicit solution of the Marshallian inverse demands is not necessary; all that is required 
is  that  software  capable  of  solving  the  identity  function  (23)  be  imbedded  in  the 
maximum likelihood computer routine. At each iterative step of the maximization of the 
likelihood function, there is a given set of parameter values. For these parameter values, 
(23) may  be  numerically  inverted to recover the value of utility consistent with the 
given values of x. Then, this value of utility can be used to eliminate the value of u from 
the inverse Hicksian share system.   
Benefit Function Specification 
In this section, we examine the two specifications on which our empirical analysis is 
based.
11 The first specification, the Simple Non -Additive Benefit (SNAB) function, 
serves to make the theoretical arguments developed in Section 2 less abstract and 
provide a bridge to our empirical analysis.  The choice is motivated by a number of 
reasons, mainly the simplicity of the functional structure, the ease of imposing and 
maintaining regularity conditions, and the fact that the number of parameters will not 
increase rapidly with the number of  inputs under consideration. More importantly, it is 
general enough to include “implicitly additive preference structure” as hypothesis to be 
tested rather than maintained. For purposes of comparison, we present and estimate the 
budget share equations corresponding to a second specification, the Baggio and Chavas 
(2006)  model (to be referred to as the B&C model). The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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The Simple Non-Additive Benefit (SNAB) Function 
Suppose that preferences are represented by the following form:  
(25)      B(x, u) =   j j j j j
jj
log( ) log( )/X1 x x u





x   with jj = 1, and i = (i + i u) / (1 + u) are the utility varying 
coefficients  with  jj  =  jj  =  1.  The  structure  (25)  maintains  all  of  the  regularity 
properties in the quantities (increasing and concave in x) of the benefit function over the 
regions log(u)  0 and xi > i  i provided that the following conditions are satisfied: 
(26)        i ≥ 0, i ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ i , i, i,  ≤ 1.       


















x   = 0. Furthermore, imposition of the restriction  = 0 gives a 
benefit  function  (to be referred to as the restricted SNAB)  which  is consistent with 
Hanoch's (1975) implicitly additive preference structure.  
As indicated by (22), differentiation of (25) after some manipulation gives the 
inverse Hicksian budget share system: 
(27)      W
IH
i (x, u) = 
η
i i i i i i i
η
j j j j j j j
j
ʴ /( γ ) η μ log( )/X1
ʴ /( γ ) η μ log( )/X1
x x x u
x x x u
   
      
. 
It is evident from (25) that it is impossible to solve explicitly for the value of u in terms 
of x and . In order to convert (27) to a Marshallian system, the unobservable u in (27) 
has to be replaced by the numerical inversion of (25) at B0  . 
 
 
The B&C Model The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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The B&C model is obtained from the following specification of the benefit function: 








,   
where Xk, k=1, 2 and 3, are three positive and continuous quantity functions. The B&C 
model results if Xk are specified as: 
 (29)    X1 = j j ij i j
j j i




, and X3 =  jj
j
x   , 
where  j, j, j, and ij are the parameters. Symmetry of the Hessian matrix of the 























  . 
These generate the following restrictions: 
(30)      jj
j
1 g   , and  ij i ij j j j j j
i j j j
0 g g g g             . 
Functions (28) and (29), on application of the Hotelling-Wold Analogue, generate 
the following system of inverse Hicksian budget share equations: 
(31)    W
IH
i (x, u) = 
2
i








1 X3 1 X3
X2
X2







                  




Elimination of u from (31) by the analytical inversion of (28) at the optimum (setting  
(28) equal to zero) leads immediately to the inverse Marshallian demand system, given 
by: The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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(32)      W
IH
i (x, u) = 
2
i ij j i i i i
j
2











        

 





It is also transparent that, given the values of parameters and quantities of good s, the 
numerical  inversion  of (28)  at  the  optimum  to  give u  in  terms  of  x  and    and  its 
substitution in (31) would give the same results as analytical inversion. 
Brief  Remarks  on  the  Database,  Estimation  and  Stochastic 
Specification 
Price-dependent or  inverse  demand  systems  have  been  used  recently  to  characterize 
short-run demand behavior for food, agricultural and fishery products. These systems 
seem  especially  useful  in  markets  for  agricultural  and  natural  resource  commodities 
where in the short run it is reasonable to argue that supplies are close to being perfectly 
inelastic. To illustrate the modeling and estimation strategies outlined in the preceding 
sections, the general SNAB function, its nested case (setting  to zero) and the B&C 
model were estimated using quarterly Japanese data on six categories of fish products – 
i) High Value Fish; ii) Medium Value Fish; iii) Low Value Fish; iv) Cuttlefish, Squid & 
Octopus; v) Lobster, Shrimp  & Crab; and  vi) Shellfish covering the period January 
1985 through December 2005. The data used are based on those of Eales, Durham and 
Wessells (1997) for 1985 to 1992, and are extended for 1993 to 2005.
 12
 The data were 
further aggregated to quarterly frequency resulting in 84 usable observations, and were 
deseasonalized and mean centered prior to estimation.
13  
One important remaining issue is the choice of reference bundle g which, because 





 = 1 implies restrictions on the parameters defining B. To 
simplify matters, we choose g to be an N-vector (0, 0,…, 1)' implying that all valuations The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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are made relative to the value of the last commodity (shellfish). In other words, the 
Luenberger price function of shellfish (P
L
6 ) is normalized to unity. This choice of g then 
implies the following parameter restrictions:  
i) the SNAB function: 6 = 1, and 6 = 6 = 6 = 0; and 
ii) the B&C model: 6 = 1, and 6 = 6 = 6j = j6 = 0 (j = 1 to 6).
14
  
  Since  the  GAUSS  language  is  ideally  suited  for  handling  the  implicit 
representation of functional relationships, the price-dependent demand systems may be 
estimated by using the GAUSS 3.6.27 computer package with the modules NLSYS and 
CML. The estimation method is non -linear Maximum Likelihood, and the inequality 
restrictions in (26) are imposed when estimating the systems.  
To implement the empirical analysis, the model has to be imbedded within a 
stochastic  framework.  To  do  so,  we  assume  that  the  budget  share  equations  are 
stochastic due to errors of optimization. Let wit denote the ith budget share at time t, zt a 
vector of all exogenous variables, and wt
n  = (w1t,……, w(N-1)t)
'
 an (N-1) x 1 vector of 
wit.
15
 The budget share system to be estimated may then be expressed compactly as: 




(xt; ) + e t
n , t = 1,……, T,         
where W
n
(.) is the vector of deterministic components of the budget share equations,  
and e t
n  is a vector of the error terms eit. To allow for serially correlated error terms, the 
following fourth-order autoregressive scheme is specified:
16
 
(34)          e t
n
 = R *
n e
n
t-4  +  t
n ,  t = 2,……, T,       
where R *
n  is an (N-1) x (N-1) autocorrelation  matrix, and   t
n
 is a  vector of serially 
uncorrelated error terms characterized by a multivariate normal distribution with zero 
mean and a constant contemporaneous covariance matrix . By using (34), (33) could The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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be rewritten as:   




(zt; ) + R*
n [
n
t-4 w  - W
n
(zt-4 ; )] +  t
n ,  t = 2,……, T,     
which forms the basis for the empirical work. 
  While  there  are  several  ways  in  which  the  autocorrelation  matrix  R *
n  may  be 
parameterized,  preliminary  analysis  revealed  that  Moschini  and  Moro
'
s 
parameterization  gave  reasonable  results  and  resulted  in  significant  parameter 
parsimony. Following Moschini and Moro
'
s (1994) procedure, the N x N counterpart to 
matrix R *








where  = (1,……,  N)', * = diag(1,……,  N),   is an N x 1 vector of ones, and 1  
to   N are the autocorrelation coefficients. In estimation, the typical elements of  R *
n  
(R*ij
n ) are recovered by using the identity  R*ij
n  = R*ij – R*iN where R*ij is the typical 
element of matrix R*. Accordingly, estimation of the equation systems with fourth order 
autoregressive  error  terms  can  be  carried  out  based  on  the  system  (35),  with  N 
additional parameter (1,……,  N) to estimate in addition to parameters . 
  Because of the adding-up restriction of the budget shares, contemporaneous errors 
t are correlated with a singular variance covariance matrix . To cope with the singular 
error  structure,  the  system  (35)  is  estimated  by  deleting  one  of  the  budget  share 
equations  in  the  share  systems  (27)  and  (32).  The  coefficients  of  the  deleted  share 
equation can be recovered by using the theoretical restrictions in conjunction with the 
estimated coefficients of the other share equations. As usual, the estimation should be 
independent of which equation is excluded. The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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Empirical Results and Their Interpretation 
Analysis of the Estimates: Comparative results for the three specifications are presented 
in table 1. The most important point to highlight from the results is that the general and 
restricted  SNAB  satisfy  the  required  regularity  conditions  for  all  observations. 
Regarding the single equation fit and performance, all three specifications fit the data 
reasonably well given that estimation is in share form: the R
2
 values range from 49.4% 
for high value fish (implied by the B&C) to 89.6% for lobster (implied by the restricted 
SNAB). The serial correlation properties of the error terms as shown in the Durbin-
Watson statistics are no longer severely pathological although there is some evidence of 
remaining autocorrelation in the residuals. This should probably be considered to be the 
small cost paid for the simplicity of Moschini and Moro's (1994) method for specifying 
autoregressive errors. 
For the general and restricted SNAB functions, the main point to make is that the 
restricted model is rejected in favor of its generalization on the basis of a 
2
 test. As can 
be seen, the computed chi-square value (
2
) is 8.604 which far exceeds the critical value 
for  
2
 of  3.841  for the  5%  significance  level.  This  leads  to the  conclusion  that the 
implicitly additive benefit function (or restricted SNAB) is overly restrictive. Of interest 
is that the B&C, while containing four (or three) more free parameters than the general 
(or  restricted)  SNAB  function,  has  a  substantially  lower  likelihood  function  value 
(1380.096 versus 1397.501 or 1380.096 versus 1393.199). This indicates a preference 
for general and restricted SNAB over B&C. Thus, the likelihood function value ranks 
the models (from most to least preferred) as follows: general SNAB, restricted SNAB 
and B&C. 
To obtain further insights into the relative performance of the three specifications, 
Pollak and Wales
'
 (1991) Likelihood Dominance Criterion (LDC) test is performed. The The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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results of this test are shown in table 2. In all cases, LDC test statistics are less than the 
lower  bound  of  the  critical  range,  which  means  the  models  with  fewer  parameters 
(general and restricted SNAB) are preferred to the model with more parameters (B&C). 
Consequently,  the  LDC  comparisons  suggest  B&C  is  not  supported  by  the  data, 
whereas the general and restricted SNAB are preferred. The preferred model is therefore 
based on the general SNAB function; its detailed parameter estimates are reported in 
table 3. 
Analysis of the Elasticity Estimates:
17
 The quantity and scale elasticity estimates for the 
general SNAB evaluated at the sample means of the exogenous variables are reported in 
table 4. Overall, these estimates offer no surprises. The  Hicksian and Marshallian own 
quantity elasticities (hii  and  mii)  are  negative,  although  their  magnitudes  are  fairly 
similar  to  those  reported  by,  for  example,  Barten  and  Bettendorf  (1989),  Holt  and 
Bishop (2002), and Wong and McLaren (2005). Additionally, most of these elasticities 
are generally greater than minus one, suggesting that all types of fish (except lobster) 
are own quantity inelastic, whereas the corresponding direct demands for fish are price 
elastic.  
With  respect  to  the  derived  Hisksian  cross  quantity  elasticities  (hij),  they  are 
generally  small  in  magnitude  –  the  largest  Hicksian  cross-quantity  elasticity  is  for 
shellfish with respect to high value fish, illustrating weak gross substitutability among 
all  types  of  fish.  These  findings  are  fairly  similar to those obtained  in  Belgium  by 
Barten and Bettendorf (1989), in U.S. by  Holt and Bishop (2002), and  in Japan by 
Wong  and  McLaren  (2005).  Regarding  the  Marshallian  cross  quantity  elasticities, 
magnitudes  for  these  estimates  are  smaller  in  absolute  terms  than  their  Hicksian 
counterparts; all cross quantity effects are, however, still very small. We also find that 
most fish pairs are gross q-substitutes as indicated by the negative signs.  The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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Turning to the scale elasticities (yi), the estimates are consistently negative whilst 
low value fish has the largest scale effect.
18
 More importantly, the estimated yi are fairly 
different from minus one, suggesting that preferences are non-homothetic. Of interest is 
that earlier estimates of the scale elasticities of  Japanese fish consumption by Eales, 
Durham and Wessells (1997), and Wong and McLaren (2005) range from -0.16 to -1.95. 
Prima facie, our estimates of scale elasticities are somewhat comparable to those in the 
early studies, although they adopted different functional forms.  
Analysis  of  Estimated  Welfare  Change:  The  main  reason  for  imposing  regularity 
restrictions such as (26) is to obtain consistent estimates for welfare losses caused by 
quantity  restrictions.  By  applying  the  theory  developed  by  Luenberger  (1995)  and 
(1996), the estimated inverse share system may be used to examine welfare changes 
associated  with  forced  reduction  in  fish  landings.  Suppose  that  an  individual's 
consumption bundle is changed from x
0




 with utility u
1
. Then the 
compensating benefit (CB) is defined by: 












)         
where the base utility u
0




) = 0. Intuitively, CB is the 
maximum amount of g that individuals are willing to give up in order to reach the utility 
level u
0
 while facing the quantity x
1
. A positive (negative) value for CB indicates that 
consumers are better (worse) off while facing quantities x
1
.   





 is defined as: 












),       
where u
1




) = 0. According to Luenberger (1995) and 
(1996), EB is the minimum amount of g needed to move individuals to the new utility 
level u
1
 while facing the initial quantities x
0
. As for CB, a positive (negative) value for The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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EB suggests that consumers are better (worse) off under x
1
 than under x
0
. 
  By using equations  (36) and (37) along with the preferred  model (the general 
SNAB function), we may compute the welfare change associated with an arbitrary 10% 
catch reduction for a particular fish species. In the application, welfare change (CB and 
EB) estimates are obtained on an annualized  basis  for 1985-2005, as well as at the 
sample means. The CB and EB estimated for selected years are reported in table 5. 
  Note first that, as expected, CB and EB are negative in all instances, indicating 
that Japanese consumers are made worse off after the reduction in the harvest of an 
individual fish species. For example, the CB for a 10% reduction in the supply of high 
(or  medium)  value  fish  is  -0.259  (or  -0.511)  unit  of  x6.  Furthermore,  the  largest 
(smallest) welfare  loss associated with the  supply reduction  is  for  medium (or low) 
value fish. Interestingly, the numerical differences between the CB and EB estimates are 
rather small, amounting to no more than 0.117 unit of x6 in all instances. In general, 
discrepancies between CB and EB are relatively small for medium and low value fish, 
lobster and cuttlefish, and are the largest for high value fish.  
Narrow fluctuations over time in CB and EB estimates are observed for medium 
and low value fish, lobster and cuttlefish. On the other hand, we find that there are 
considerable  variations  in  the  magnitude  of  EB  for  high  value  fish  across  years. 
Particularly, in 1985 the EB estimate associated with a 10% reduction in high value fish 
catch was -0.371 unit of x6, whereas the comparable estimate for 1995 was -0.186 unit 
of x6, over a 50% decrease (in absolute value). Possibly, this result simply reflects the 




The application of duality theory in consumer demand studies has allowed specification 
of a wide range of functional forms, which has helped considerably in the generation of 
empirical  price-dependent  demand  systems.  For  the  most  part,  specification  has 
concentrated upon either the direct utility function or the distance function. Recently, 
more attention has been paid to the benefit function, but this has been mainly in the 
context of study of welfare issues. In this paper, we advocate a more extensive use of 
benefit  functions  in  specifying  inverse  demand  models  by  exploring  the  inter-
relationships between the inverse Marshallian (or Hicksian) demands, and Luenberger's 
adjusted price-dependent demands. It has been demonstrated that for a chosen benefit 
function, application of an analogue to the Hotelling-Wold Identity yields expressions 
for inverse Hicksian normalized price functions. While these functions are explicit in 
the  level  of  utility,  in  most  cases  they  do  not have  a  closed-form  representation  as 
corresponding Marshallian functions i.e. in terms of observable variables. This aspect, 
however, need not hinder estimation, and was solved by applying a numerical inversion 
estimation method, as illustrated in Section 2. 
The  implementation  of  the  proposed  methods  relies  on  relatively  simple 
functional forms to specify the benefit function, and the one used in this paper (referred 
to as the SNAB function), allows a simple generalization away from implicitly additive 
preferences. The application of the SNAB function was illustrated with an application to 
Japanese fish demand. Results in Section 4 generally indicate that this new specification 
is statistically preferred over the Baggio and Chavas (2006) model. Results also show 
that the modeling procedures and estimation methods employed here are promising and 
operationally feasible, and that the general and restricted SNAB functions satisfy their 
required regularity conditions for all observations in the sample period. This leads to the The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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conclusion that specification of preferences in terms of the benefit function may open 
up  a  wider  range  of  empirical  price-dependent  demand  specifications  that  may  be 
constrained to satisfy tight theoretical restrictions.  
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Table 1: Single Equation and System Measures of Fit 
  The General 
SNAB 
The Restricted 
SNAB ( = 0) 
The B&C 
Log Likelihood Values  1397.501  1393.199  1380.096 
No. of Parameters  27  26  31 
R
2
       
High Value Fish  0.550  0.514  0.494  
Medium Value Fish  0.752  0.751  0.750  
Low Value Fish  0.652  0.648  0.649  
Lobster  0.895  0.896  0.893  
Cuttlefish  0.706  0.708  0.728  
Shellfish  0.683  0.683  0.695  
Durbin-Watson Statistics 
High Value Fish  2.485  2.621  2.741 
Medium Value Fish  2.474  2.492  2.497 
Low Value Fish  2.155  2.136  2.424 
Lobster  1.831  1.873  1.819 
Cuttlefish  1.780  1.758  2.039 
Shellfish  1.946  1.937  2.158 
Likelihood Ratio Test  
H0:  = 0  i (rejected)   
Test Statistic = 8.604 and 
2
1, 5% χ  = 3.841 
 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Non-Nested Comparisons 
 
Comparison (M1 versus M2)  Test 
Statistic 




General SNAB– Null Model  
v.s.  





Restricted SNAB– Null Model  
v.s.  






Note: M1 (or M2) is the  model  with fewer (or more) independent parameters in the  model 
comparison. 
In each cell, the first value is the lower bound of the LDC critical ranges, computed as: 
0.5  [C(N2+1)-C(N1+1)], whilst the second value is the lower bound of the LDC critical 
ranges, computed as 0.5  [C(N2-N1+1)-C(1)], where N1 (or N2) denotes the number of 
parameters in M1 (or M2), and C(v) denotes the critical value of a  
2
 statistic with v 
degrees of freedom at the chosen significance level. The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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Table  3:  Parameter  Estimates  for  the  Preferred  Model  (Asymptotic  T 
Ratios in Parentheses) 
 
1  0.302  (2.558)  1  0.337  (5.078)    0.061  (5.290) 
2  0.182  (1.960)  2  0.608  (9.163)  1  0.100  (0.362) 
3  0.155  (5.853)  3  0.055  (3.809)  2  0.590  (5.977) 
4  0.124  (2.808)  4  0.000  (0.001)  3  0.040  (1.128) 
5  0.236  (6.114)  5  0.000    4  0.080  (1.342) 
1  0.117  (0.896)  1  0.189  (0.914)  5  0.000   
2  0.268  (2.280)  2  0.257  (0.593)  6  0.000   
3  0.036  (0.399)  3  0.194  (0.517)  1  0.999  (199.980) 
4  0.228  (1.816)  4  0.146  (0.260)  2  0.999  (142.843) 
5  0.351  (1.675)  5  0.215  (0.231)  3  0.999  (164.104) 
            4  0.974  (145.612) 
            5  0.998  (209.385) 
            6  0.480  (26.661) 
 
Note: The constraints 0  
5 , 
6  1 and 0  
5   1 were binding, and hence no t-values are 
reported.  
The estimated t-ratios must be interpreted with care since the standard asymptotic theory 
is unfortunately inapplicable when parameters are subject to inequality constraints. The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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Table 4: Elasticity Estimates for the General SNAB function (Asymptotic T Ratios 
in Parentheses) 
 








High Value   -0.286  0.267  0.053  0.118  0.132  -0.285 
  (-7.018)  (6.874)  (6.116)  (7.489)  (6.799)  (-9.448) 
Medium Value   0.211  -0.447  0.072  0.145  0.168  -0.150 
  (6.278)  (-3.927)  (4.644)  (4.344)  (9.895)  (-4.994) 
Low Value  0.244  0.366  -0.608  0.174  0.190  -0.366 
  (9.965)  (8.870)  (-12.595)  (5.572)  (6.999)  (-7.726) 
Lobster  0.250  0.483  0.083  -0.929  0.191  -0.078 
  (12.413)  (12.700)  (9.194)  (-32.504)  (9.315)  (-4.801) 
Cuttlefish  0.240  0.456  0.081  0.155  -0.814  -0.117 
  (11.779)  (12.759)  (9.184)  (9.079)  (-37.543)  (-7.078) 
Shellfish  -0.642  -0.491  -0.234  -0.085  -0.148  -0.255 
  (-8.494)  (-5.005)  (-6.180)  (-2.721)  (-4.889)  (-13.751) 








High Value   -0.574  -0.153  -0.029  -0.014  -0.028  -0.414 
  (-19.909)  (-2.091)  (-11.295)  (-9.491)  (-18.762)  (-10.318) 
Medium Value   -0.073  -0.859  -0.009  0.012  0.011  -0.276 
  (-13.465)  (-6.127)  (-3.676)  (7.923)  (8.203)  (-10.061) 
Low Value  -0.229  -0.323  -0.742  -0.044  -0.073  -0.578 
  (-15.441)  (-4.399)  (-16.387)  (-16.264)  (-21.822)  (-9.495) 
Lobster  -0.037  0.065  0.002  -1.061  0.031  -0.207 
  (-6.149)  (0.832)  (0.786)  (-63.350)  (16.447)  (-9.325) 
Cuttlefish  -0.060  0.018  -0.005  0.017  -0.982  -0.252 
  (-10.624)  (0.235)  (-2.167)  (10.611)  (-1033.101)  (-10.557) 
Shellfish  -0.087  -0.035  -0.013  0.007  0.003  -0.300 
  (-12.783)  (-0.484)  (-6.779)  (6.125)  (7.294)  (-11.633) 
  Scale Elasticities 
  y1  y2  y3  y4  y5  y6 
  -1.212  -1.194  -1.989  -1.207  -1.264  -0.423 
  (-13.519)  (-10.193)  (-20.291)  (-12.215)  (-13.424)  (-4.888) 
 The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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 Table 5: Annualized Compensating and Equivalent Benefit for a 10% Increase in 
Supply of All Types of Fish 
 
Fish Category  CB  EB 
1985 
High Value   -0.259  -0.376 
Medium Value   -0.511  -0.510 
Low Value   -0.074  -0.074 
Lobster  -0.083  -0.083 
Cuttlefish  -0.125  -0.125 
Shellfish  -0.100  -0.100 
1995 
High Value   -0.256  -0.186 
Medium Value   -0.526  -0.525 
Low Value   -0.069  -0.069 
Lobster  -0.099  -0.099 
Cuttlefish  -0.147  -0.147 
Shellfish  -0.100  -0.100 
2005 
High Value   -0.249  -0.262 
Medium Value   -0.502  -0.501 
Low Value   -0.074  -0.074 
Lobster  -0.091  -0.090 
Cuttlefish  -0.134  -0.133 
Shellfish  -0.100  -0.100 
Sample Average 
High Value   -0.248  -0.224 
Medium Value   -0.514  -0.513 
Low Value   -0.071  -0.071 
Lobster  -0.093  -0.093 
Cuttlefish  -0.139  -0.138 
Shellfish  -0.100  -0.100 
 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Eales and Unnevehr (1994), Holt (2002), Holt and Bishop (2002), and 
Wong and McLaren (2005).  
2
 See Luenberger (1992), pp. 468-469. 
3
 In  Baggio and  Chavas (2006), since the specification of the benefit function can be 
analytically inverted to derive the implied direct utility function, the closed form inverse 
Marshallian demands can be derived. Thus the invers e Marshallian demands could have been 
derived just as easily by applying the Hotelling-Wold Identity to the corresponding direct utility The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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function, and thus this does not represent an advance in our ability to represent a wider class of 
underlying preference orderings. 
4
 See McLaren et al (2000), and Wong and McLaren (2005). 
5
 The definition of a benefit function is illustrated in Luenberger (1995), pp. 98-99. 
6
 See Deaton (1979). 
7
 See Luenberger (1996), p. 449. 
8
 Superscripts have been suppressed for simpl icity. The mapping from R to S is in fact 
equation 2.12 in Chambers, Chung and Fare (1996). 
9
 The same derivation could apply to the distance function D( x, u), with the identity D(x, 










x B x D D
D  

, by homogeneity of D, and D = 1, which 
provides  further  insight  into  the  relation  between  these  functions.  See  also  Chambers,  Chung 
and  Fare  (1996). This  relationship  also  says  something  ab out  the  way  in  which  the  reference 
vector  g  may  enter  into  the  functional  specification  of  B,  since  the  corresponding  inverse 
Hicksian demands are independent of g. 
10
 This is essentially the procedure employed in Baggio and Chavas (2006). 
11
 See  Luenberger  (1992),  p.  469-472  for  examples  of  using  other  functional  forms  to 
represent the benefit function. 
12
 See Eales, Durham and Wessells (1997), p. 1157 for a complete description of the data. 
13
 The seasonal adjustment of the data set was done with the help of  SAMA procedure in 
TSP version 4.5 package. An alternative approach to accounting for seasonality’s effects is to 
specify each i (or i) parameter in (27) (or (31)) to be a function of three quarterly dummy 
variables and a constant, as suggested by Eales and Unnevehr (1994), and Holt and Bishop The Benefit Function Approach to Modeling Price-Dependent Demand Systems 
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(2002). Note however that this will significantly increase the number of parameters, which may 
create estimation convergence problems.    
14
 The i
th adjusted price function is derived by applying the envelope theorem to (25) and 
(28). Thus, 
i) the SNAB function  P
L













ii) the B&C model  P
L
i (x, u; g) = 
2
i








               . 





P g   = 1 must hold for all x and u, 
these imply the following parameter restrictions:  
i) the SNAB function: 
6 = 
6 = 
6 = 0; and 
ii) the B&C model: 
6 = 1, and 
6 = 
6 = 
6j = 0 (j = 1 to 6). 
15
 The  superscript  “n”  indicates  the  last  row  (row  and  column)  of  the  respective  vector 
(matrix) has been annihilated.  
16
 Preliminary analysis revealed significant autocorrelation in the residuals of (33) at lag four.  
17
 For reasons of brevity,  the elasticity equations derived from  the general SNAB are not 
presented below. The derivations of these equations are available separately. 
18
 Scale elasticities (yi), reported in the third part of  table 3, measure the potential response 
of commodity price to a proportionate increase in all commoditi es. For example, the scale 
elasticity for high value fish is  -1.212, which indicates that a 1% proportionate increase in all 
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Appendix: Elasticity Equations for the SNAB Function 
Let  ij M  denote the Marshallian quantity elasticities for commodity i with respect to xj, 
Si the  scale  elasticity  of  commodity  i,  and  ij H  the  Hicksian  quantity  elasticities  for 
commodity i with respect to xj. To facilitate thinking about preferences in terms of a 
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Given the functional form of the SNAB function, it follows that the quantity and 
scale elasticity equations are expressed as: 
ij M  = - ij + 
i
ij i ij i j
i
















Si = -1 + 
i
ij i ij i j
i i


















, and  
ij H = - ij + 
i
2 η
ij i ij i j
i














































































, Bxi = B/xi = 
i
i i i i η
i
μ ηlog( )





   , and  





















    
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